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title: Nirvana Fallacy
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- destiny/permanent
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- type/encyclopedia-entry
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# Nirvana Fallacy
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The [nirvana fallacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nirvana_fallacy)
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also called the "perfect solution fallacy"
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is the mistake made when a solution proposed to replace one existing
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is judged against a hypothetical perfect solution
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rather than the solution in current use.
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> [!quote] Harold Demsetz "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint" (1969)[^1]
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> The view that now pervades much public policy economics
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> implicitly presents the relevant choice
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> as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement.
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> This _nirvana_ approach differs considerably
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> from a _comparative institution_ approach
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> in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.
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[^1]: Harold Demsetz
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"Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint"
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_The Journal of Law and Economics_
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Volume 12, Number 1
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(April 1969)
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[doi:10.1086/466657](https://doi.org/10.1086%2F466657)
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